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Kinds of Unity, Modes of Union
Solus ille qui attingit rem in præcisione suæ unionis attingit rem ut est ipsa.
(G. Pico della Mirandola, Concl. nong., V, 3, 4)
Kinds of unity, modes of union—why bother? Does Leibniz ever focus on “union”, anyway? It is
not before 1713 that Leibniz gets rid of certain metaphysical concerns which, although secondary for
him, were present to his mind since the time of his 1708 answer to Tournemine, who had bespoken a
“real union” between the soul and the body (GP VI, 595-96). Nonetheless, this very text shows that
for Leibniz unity and union don’t partake an equivalent metaphysical dignity: factually, union never
seems to be a primitive of his doctrine of being, like perfection, essence, or unity, undoubtedly are.
“Mes meditations fondamentales roulent sur deux choses” (GP VII, 542), and one of the two is unity.
But of course, when unity is not the proprium of a simple substance (unity per se et absolute), then
some sort of union is called for; yet its consideration requires taking a somewhat different route.
The investigation of cogitabilia is a favorite Leibnizian pastime of the years 1680’s: he really
enjoys enumerating “terminos simpliciores per quos alii possint definiri”, as he words it in a writing
where cogitabile itself comes first, divided into impossibile and possibile, the latter being in turn
“positivum ut Ens, aut negativum ut non Ens” (A VI, IV, 388). Such is the typical cogitabile, as it
can be spotted out in another leibnizian text of roughly the same years: “Omne cogitabile est vel Ens
vel Non Ens. Ens est de quo aliquid affirmari potest” (A VI, IV, 1506). “Being” and “existent” may
even be considered primitive notions: “Existens definiri non potest, non magis quam Ens seu pure
positivum, ita scilicet ut possit notio aliqua clarior nobis exhiberi” (A VI, IV, 626).
The ground level of true unity should be, in Leibniz’s view, exactly that of entia; as he often likes
to write, he approves the scholastic maxim “ens et unum convertuntur”. But he also holds, as we read
f.i. in the often quoted De mundo præsenti (DMP), the Aristotelian distinction of unum per accidens
and unum per se ; whereby some mode of union is required, to be given unity by the substantial form,
and that is the “real union” of the per se unum, otherwise there will be an accidental unity, due to
simple contact or to mental assembling:
“Omne Ens reale est unum per se aut Ens per Accidens. Ens per se ut Homo, Ens per accidens, ut strues lignorum,
machina, quod scilicet non est unum nisi per aggregationem, nec alia in eo realis unio est, quam connexio vel
contactus aut etiam concursus ad idem vel saltem convenientia a mente umana in unum colligente animadversa. At
in Ente per se, realis quædam unio requiritur consistens non in partium situ et motu ut in catena, domo, navi sed
in unico quodam individuo principio et subjecto attributorum et operationum, quod in nobis dicitur anima, in omni
corpore forma substantialis modo id sit unum per se” (A VI, IV, 1506).
Moreover, in every positive term we conceive a subject, as different from its modes: “Subjectum
aliquod, sive Rem, et Attributum seu Rei Modum. Ultimum subjectum Substantia appellatur. Reliquæ
res vocantur accidentia” (A VI, IV, 388). Here we see the skeleton of an ontological hierarchy: under
Ens we range complex realms of reality. According to Leibniz’s sketches of the late 1670s and early
’80s there are very general headings under which notions should be ranged, often characterized by a
certain degree of variability in specifications. We might find f.i. “Realitas”, “Varietas”, “Consequen-
tia”, “Ordo”, “Mutatio” (A VI, IV, 399), and under realitas we’ll meet possibile, positivum, etc., “vel
horum contraria [...] unde Ens et non Ens, Subjectum et Attributum, Deus et creatura” (A VI,  IV,
398). Leibniz will firstly try to tell apart, inside the realm of being, what is real and what unreal: a
distinction that is mainly drawn from a perceptual viewpoint. Some time after the composition of
the DM, he writes: “Ens est distincte cogitabile. Existens distincte percepibile [...] Chimæra seu Ens
falsum quod est cogitabile, sed non distincte”. Subsequently come appearances: “Phantasma seu ap-
parens [seu] Existens falsum, perceptibile sed non distincte” (A VI, IV, 870). Now something falsely
existent seems to be devoid of reality, yet it appears in a normal perceptual setting, although it is not
Cf. respectively Aquinas, Quodl., VI, q. 1 co.: “unumquodque in quantum est unum, in tantum est ens; unde ens
et unum convertuntur [...] et unumquodque per suam formam habet unitatem”; and Met., V, 6, 1015b15.
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what it seems: so its appearance isn’t real, but there must be something real. It is the well-known
ambiguous realm of apparent realia, those that he will oscillatingly call phænomena bene fundata, or
semi-entia, as we’ll see further, or imaginary beings:
“Omne Ens vel est Reale vel Imaginarium. Ens Reale, quod est citra mentis operationem ut sol de quo judicamus
ex consensu plurium perceptionum. Ens imaginarium quod secundum unum percipiendi modum percipitur ad instar
Entis realis, ut iris, parhelius , Somnium, sed secundum alios modos non percipitur neque examina sustinet, [...]
unde sequitur a dispositione nostri et medii fieri quod percipitur [...]” (A VI, IV, 1506).
Leibniz is normally eager to categorize those items that are real but not substantial as modi. “Omne
Ens est vel Substantia vel Accidens seu Modus. Substantia ut Mens, corpus. Modus ut calor, motus”
(A VI, IV, 1506). A writing of the late ’70s exhibits a slightly different approach, more oriented
to representation: “Prima distinctio eorum quæ per notiones humanas repræsentantur videtur esse
in Res, et rerum Modos”. There also are “modi Modorum, ita calor est modus corporis, magnitudo
modus caloris, ratio modus magnitudinis, analogia modus rationis” etc. (A VI, IV, 145). Here res
is anything real, and not necessarily a substance . Even merely relational entities, whose realness is
openly derivative, belong to the field of reality:
Spatium et tempus non sunt Res, sed relationes reales. Nullus est locus absolutus, nec motus, quia nulla sunt principia
determinandi subjectum motus. [...] et [...] in solo respectu consistunt [...] At vis motrix sive potentia agendi reale
est quiddam, discernique in corporibus potest. Itaque essentia corporis non in extensione et ejus modificationibus,
figura scilicet et motu [...] sed in sola vi agendi resistendique collocanda est” (A VI, IV, 1621-23).
Thus we are faced with different domains, whose most apparent partition is that into Cogitabile,
Possibile, Ens, Reale, Substantiale—each a subset of the previous one. In fact an ens, besides God,
is roughly anything that exists as a created object. So ens, res, substantia, corpus, perhaps even
“appearance”, are names for different kinds or classes of identifiable existents, and their various
identifiability seems to be a matter of different kinds of unity. While perfection notoriously has
degrees, and ontology has levels (whereas sentients are arranged into classes), neither unity nor union
uniformly gradate, nor do they simply fit into levels; but, in more or less loose correspondence to
those other features of creation, and correlated to the architectonic of the Leibnizian universe, i.e.
connected to its structure of ontological levels and different ontological views of the world, there are
different kinds of unity, greater or lesser, that might be viably qualified as different modes of union.
Union is the conjunction of many in one. It is characterized, in fact, by the way it works (quemad-
modum?). It is a relation: “unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio” , or, in posterior lingo, ad
relationis genus spectat. Let’s follow Aquinas: “proprie secundum unionem dicitur aliquid unitum,
sicut secundum unitatem dicitur aliquid unum” (De un. V., a. 1 ad 5). Of course, from a philosophical
point of view, just like the most famous unity is the triunity of the trinity, the most famous union in the
span of time that runs from Boethius to Aquinas is that of human and divine natures in Christ—which,
by the way, is mirrored in the union of human body and soul . So it is in the Third part of the
Summa, that we’ll have to look after a thorough treatment of union. In fact q. 2 handles “de modo
unionis [...] primo quantum ad ipsam unionem”. Union of two or more in one is threefold: first,
“ex duobus integris perfectis remanentibus”, as in a heap of stones, or in a house, with a mere
“forma accidentalis”. Elsewhere Thomas discusses the subdivisions of this kind of union, “et neutra
harum est unio simpliciter, sed secundum quid” . This “secundum quid” is explained here in the
two mentioned cases respectively as “per modum confusionis”, or “per modum commensurationis”.
In the Notationes generales of 1683-85, he explains how certain real appearances arise from aggregative union:
“Iridem parhelia aliaque id genus phænomena realia dici posse arbitror tanquam Entia per aggregationem, ut
struem lignorum, vel exercitum, est enim iris aggregatum guttarum quæ simul junctæ certos colores nobis
apparentes producunt” (A VI, IV, 555).
Leibniz differentiates in a similar way res from substantia in a late letter to Des Bosses: “Recte tuemur corpora
esse res, nam et phænomena sunt realia. Sed si quis tueri velit corpora esse substantias, indigebunt, credo, novo
quodam principio unionis realis” (GP II, 492). Again, this is not the “real union” that Tournemine requested for
body and soul, as separate res, but such a union that makes of its unitum a res capable of action.
Aquinas, Ia-IIæ, q. 26, a. 2 arg. 2; as Scotus puts it, “quando materia et forma sunt unita, est relatio mutua unionis
inter illa” (Quæst. in Met., 8, 4).
That is also Trinitatis vestigium, to use Augustine’s words (De Trin., 6, 10: “cuius [...] vestigium”) as quoted by
Peter Lombard (Sent. I, d. III, 1).











Second, “ex perfectis, sed transmutatis, sicut ex elementis fit mixtum”, and this one happens “per
modum complexionis”. Last, “ex aliquibus non permixtis vel permutatis, sed imperfectis”, and this
comes to pass either “per modum formæ et materiæ, sicut ex anima et corpore fit homo”, or “per
modum partium quantitativarum, ut ex membris constituitur corpus”. This is unmistakably the typical
union to be found in substances, and specifically in those corporeal substances quite notorious to
Leibnizian scholars.
Disparate meanings of “corporeal substances” (CS) coexist. In a long tradition, bodies, considered
as substances, are named CS: Boethius, commenting Porphyry, in order to explain the text “Substantia
est quidem et ipsa genus, sub hac autem est corpus, sub corpore vero animatum corpus” etc., writes:
“ut sit corpus substantia, cum corporalitate coniungitur et est substantia corporea corpus” (In Isag.,
III, 4). In the DMP we read this definition: “Substantia omnis habet intra se operationem quandam,
eaque vel est ejusdem in se ipsum, quæ dicitur Reflexio, sive Cogitatio, et talis substantia est spiritu-
alis, sive Mens, vel est diversarum partium, et talis Substantia dicitur Corporea” (A VI, IV, 1507). It
is the case that “Mens est, aut secreta, aut corpori unita. Secreta, ut Deus, unita, ut anima nostra” (A
VI, IV, 1507). Angels and genies also have bodies. Furthermore, this sort of ”substantia corporea”,
i.e. the complex of the individual substance and its body; habet partes et species”. Species are the
various kinds of bodily existents. “Partes sunt materia et forma. Materia est principium passionis,
[...] Forma substantialis est principium actionis seu vis agendi primitiva” (A VI, IV, 1507-08). The
substantial form is indispensable: “Hanc formam substantialem necesse est reperiri in omnibus sub-
stantiis corporeis, quæ sunt unum per se. Itaque si bestiæ non sunt puræ machinæ, necesse est formas
substantiales habere quæ dicuntur animæ” (A VI, IV,1508).
It’s easy to differentiate other uses of the expression: a generic one, used in “ad hominem” contexts;
the simple monad considered with passivity (and so corporeal substance is a substance that has a
reference to a body) . CSs, in the latter sense, don’t include the body, but do include both that passivity
that makes them consider a collection of infinite other substances as their body (this is imperfection),
and a clearer representation of it (this is perfection; it makes for the dominant monad). Sometimes
Leibniz manages to unify the two main acceptations of CSs, as when writing to Bierling in 1711:
“Corpus autem est vel substantia corporea vel massa ex substantiis corporeis collecta. Substantiam
corpoream voco quæ in substantia simplice seu monade (id est anima vel Animæ analogo) et unito ei
corpore organico consistit. At Massa est aggregatum substantiarum corporearum ut caseus interdum
ex confluge vermium consistit” (GP VII, 501-02). Aponto come si fa il formazo nel latte, et in quel
deventorno vermi: Leibniz pays homage to C. Ginzburg’s Menocchio.
Back to the crucial ’80s. Leibniz asserted around 1678 that “nullo modo probari potest ratione
naturali, quod dentur substantiæ divisibiles seu corporeæ” (A VI, IV, 1369). In 1683 things change:
“Quot sunt animæ Tot sunt Atomi substantiales”, viz. the elements of the substantial reality, “seu
substantiæ corporeæ” (A VI, IV, 1466). In a short writing that deals with physiology , he promises:
“aliquando demonstrabimus, aliud longe esse vim, aliud motum, et motum quidem inesse moli extensæ, vim autem
motricem inesse alteri cuidam subjecto, quod in corporibus promiscuis formam substantialem, in viventibus Animam
vocant, in Homine Mentem, inde sensus quoque atque appetitus in Animalibus origo, unioque animæ et corporis,
et modus quo vel in corpus agit Anima, vel a corpore patitur, poterit explicari inexpectata claritate”.
In spite of oscillations, concerning f.i. the souls of beasts, it is at this epoch that the theory of sub-
stance begins to stabilize, and the expression “corporeal substance” dependably turns out in Leibniz’s
texts. A remarkable one is Mira de natura substantiæ corporeæ (1683), where we read that “est in
omni creatura et limitatum et infinitum”, and every soul, “aut potius omnis substantia corporea” is
“omniscia confuse et omnipotens refracte”. Creatures, quite expectably, are composed of matter and
form, and it is that precisely which makes them corporeal:
“Omnis creatura habet materiam et formam sive corporea est. Omnis substantia est immortalis. Omnis substantia
ut tunica homini; [...] vel per modum aggregationis, sicut lapis lapidi in acervo; vel aliquo accidente, sicut homo
unitur Deo per amorem vel gratiam” etc. (Aquinas, Super Sent., 3, d. 6 q. 1 a. 2 co.); “unio simpliciter”: what
Suarez would call pura unio (e.g. Disp. met., 15 VI 8).
“Chaque substance corporelle n’agit que par sa propre force et n’en reçoit jamais d’ailleurs” (GP III, 260). Here
the corporeal substance is a monad, insofar as it is supplied with a body: the body in itself can but receive
impulsions in the interplay of secondary causes.





corporea habet animam. Omnis anima est immortalis. Probabile est omnem animam imo omnem substantiam cor-
poream semper ab initio rerum extitisse. Strues aliqua seu ens per aggregationem ut lapidum congeries non dicetur
substantia corporea sed est phænomenon tantum” (A VI, IV, 1465-66).
For Leibniz, “le pluriel suppose le singulier” (GP II, 97); he always repeats to Arnauld: “il y doit
avoir des Entelechies s’il y a des substances corporelles” (GP II, 124). Forms are infinitely many, there
is no part of matter “où il n’y ait dedans des corps animés, ou au moins informés, c’est-à-dire—and this
is quite near to a proper definition—des substances corporelles” (Le Roy, 186), “toutes [...] vivantes”
(GP II, 118). It is the presence of the form, or entelechy, that saves CSs, or even “brute substances”,
“material substances” (GP II, 124-125), from accidentality: “la masse etendue considerée sans les
Entelechies [...] n’est pas la substance corporelle, mais un phenomene tout pur comme l’arc en ciel”
(GP II, 119). In 1682-83 he had written: “Pono id quod non majorem habet Unionem, quam ligna
in fasce seu strue lignorum, vel lateres sibi impositi, non esse proprie unum Ens sed potius Entia,
licet unum pro omnibus nomen ponatur” (A VI, IV, 1464). Unum per accidens may have degrees,
but it is all the same in the end: “Je demeure d’accord qu’il y a des degrés de l’unité accidentelle [...]
mais enfin toutes ces unités ne reçoivent leur accomplissement que des pensées et des apparences,
comme les couleurs et les autres phenomenes, qu’on ne laisse pas d’appeller reels” (GP II, 100). But
natural machines are endowed with more than a mechanical union: “sans me mettre en peine de ce
que les scholastiques ont appellé formam corporeitatis, je donne des formes substantielles à toutes
les substances corporelles plus que machinalement unies”(GP II, 77). This also means that the same
entities may be united in different modes, i.e. different modes of union coexist.
To be individual doesn’t equal to be unum per se . In fact leaves and drops, that aren’t, are nonethe-
less suitable instances for a discussion of the identity of indiscernibles. And to enjoy real existence
there is no need to be a substance. To strictly be a unity, it is required to be existing per se, to be a sub-
stance. As Aquinas wrote: “unicuique autem ad seipsum est unitas, quæ est potior unione” (IIa-IIæ, q.
25, a. 4 co.). The parts of a body really exist, but a body doesn’t exist as such in an independent way.
Corporeal things, on the one hand, truly have unity, are individual; on the other hand they don’t exist
per se in reality. In a sense, if they have such unity as typical of living, animated beings, they are CSs.
In a different sense, individual simple substances are CSs, i.e. they are endowed with a body that, say,
accompanies them. CSs have a unity of their own, and so has, in its way, their body. But the body as
such is endowed by the mature Leibniz with a lesser kind of unity. Change in bodily states of things
show that it receives its unity, instead of having its own. Everything in the world gyrates “in fluxu
perpetuo” (GP II, 370); organic bodies are in perpetual change “et nos corpus mutamus, ut fortasse
senes nihil materiæ infantis retineamus” (GP II, 321). Matter receives its stability form conspiring
movements, but as a machinal system it depends on a unifying substantial principle: “materia instar
fluminis mutatur, manente Entelechia , dum machina subsistit” (GP II, 306).
As he states in a letter to Arnauld of 1686: “à mon avis nostre corps en luy même, l’ame mise à part,
ou le cadaver, ne peut estre appellé une substance que par abus, comme une machine ou comme un tas
de pierres, qui ne sont que des estres par aggregation; car l’arrangement regulier ou irregulier ne fait
rien à l’unité substantielle” (GP II, 75; cf. GP II, 73). The bottom line, since the correspondence with
Arnauld, is that «il n’y a que les substances indivisibles et leur differens estats qui soyent absolument
reels» (GP II, 119). Problem here: the body per se is thus reduced to junk reality. It has at best inherited
realness: “Je ne dis pas qu’il n’y ait rien de substantiel ou rien que d’apparent dans les choses qui
n’ont pas une veritable unité, car j’accorde qu’ils ont tousjours autant de realité ou de substantialité,
qu’il y a de veritable unité dans ce qui entre dans leur composition” (GP II, 97).
Why this insistence? The reason is well known: “chez moi la notion de la substance singuliere
enveloppe des suites incompatibles avec un estre par aggregation; je conçois des proprietés dans la
substance qui ne sçauroient estre expliquées par l’étendue, la figure et le mouvement” (GP II, 97).
“Ea vero nomina quæ sunt communia individuis substantiarum et accidentium, ut individuum et singulare,
possunt et toti et partibus aptari” (Aquinas, Comp. theol., lib. 1 cap. 211. Apparently, only God has unity (in
multiplicity) without union. Monads, we said, have anyway unitas simpliciter, although they are composite of
entelechy and primary passive. ).
“Cum autem substantia immaterialis habeat esse magis fixum et stabile quam substantia corporea” (Aquinas,





This is important on the grounds both of mathematics and physics (for the theory of the continuum),
and of the foundation of Dynamics, which is the theoretic link between mechanic and metaphysics,
as being the true natural science of reality:
“Ego vero ut consilii mei rationes tandem aperiam, quantitatem resistentiæ seu effectus non æstimo gradibus veloc-
itatis, hoc est entibus modalibus sive incompletis, sed substantiis seu realibus absolutis. [...] Et quamcunque demum
realem virium mensuram assumo, semper consensum reperio etiam pro reliquis. Sed ubi modalis quædam mensura
assumta est, gradus verbi gratia velocitatis replicandus sine replicatione corporis [...] illico induimur in absurditates,
et sine causa vel amittimus partem potentiæ, vel lucramus”
Leibniz happens to use both the expressions “substantia corporea” and “substantia incorporea” ,
but he steadily maintains that all finite substances have a body (or “quasi”, if I read correctly in LH
IV 1, 1a, 8r—see further). At times he seems to be not only dematerializing bodies, but drastically
derealizing them as well:
“Entia per aggregationem ut Grex, piscina piscibus abundans, Machina, non sunt nisi semi-Entia quorum realitas
consistit in unione, quam facit Mens, seu in denominatione extrinseca sive relatione. Qualis est distantia et harmonia
præstabilita, quæ facit ut unum in aliud influere videatur. Sunt ergo resultantia relativa seu mentalia.
Si duo corpora cohæreant, hoc fit non reali unione, sed velut per accidens singulis, dum ab ambiente ad se invicem
pelluntur. Nec contactus unionem facit, cum momentaneus esse queat, imo soleat, rursusque a se resiliant quæ
concurrere” (LH IV 3, 5, 23r).
But this approach is vulnerable to a critic, that has been most clearly formulated by D. Rutherford:
“in the strictest sense there is no unitary organism if this is understood as the composite of a soul-like monad and its
associated corporeal mass [...] if Leibniz accepts the theory of monads he is committed to the rejection of organic
creatures as genuine corporeal substances: animated bodies that possess the property of being an unum per se” .
Moreover, in the 80’s Leibniz seems to consider body and soul, as far as the deployment of their
union is concerned, as two terms to be considered as such; thus in 1685 he writes: “Species organicæ:
plantæ, animalia, homines, angeli (species constant ex substantia simplice et corpore seu aggregato
organico)” (A VI, IV, 635). Leibniz provides thereto his New System, “quam ego Hypothesin con-
comitantiæ appello” (A VI, IV, 1621). We might say we are furnished with a union “per modum
concomitantiæ”—that is, by way of association, attendance: not that much, especially if we consider
that his metaphysics has become quite more complex in the meantime.
1. A living being is certainly a complete substance, but the individual substance that gives unity
to the body isn’t , and seems now to depend, more suareziano, from the contribution of its matter:
“impossibile est illam unionem conservari sine concursu materiæ seu quin sit in materia eo modo quo
esse potest” (Disp. met., 13 IX 9). The subsistentia machinæ, as we have seen, is a condition for the
staying of the manente entelechia (GP II, 306).
2. Composition enters into the union of matter and form. Dynamics has made the form itself become
composite; the multiplicity of forms that is present in the bodily mass comes to play its own role: “je
distingue la substance corporelle de la matiere, et je distingue la matiere premiere de la seconde. La
matiere seconde est un aggregé ou composé de plusieurs substances corporelles” (GP III, 260-61). In
his famous letter to De Volder (1703), Leibniz presents the monad as composed of the entelechy, i.e.
an active principle, and of her primary passivity; it is this that is related to the mass of the organic body.
“Distinguo ergo (1) Entelechiam primitivam seu Animam, (2) Materiam nempe primam seu potentiam
passivam primitivam, (3) Monadem his duabus completam, (4) Massam seu materiam secundam,
sive machinam organicam, ad quam innumeræ concurrunt Monades subordinatæ, (5) Animal seu
substantiam corpoream, quam unam facit Monas dominans in Machina” (GP II, 252).
G.G.L. De legibus naturæ et vera æstimatione virium motricium contra Cartesianos, Acta Erud. 1691, 445-46.
See further. Such would be the purest of monads (C.S. Peirce, CP II, 149: “we must think of a metaphysical
monad as a pure nature, or quality, in itself without parts or features, and without embodiment”).
D. Rutherford, “Metaphysics: the Late Period”, in: N. Jolley (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz,
Cambridge (Mass.), 1995, p. 155. It is indeed sort of a scotist objection: “sequitur quod compositum nec illis nec
altero illorum sit unum, sed ipsa unione illorum, quæ est relatio. Et ita quodlibet compositum essentialiter erit
relativum, quia illud est de essentia cuiuscumque quo completive ipsum est unum essentialiter, quia eodem est
ens et unum” (Quæst. pot. in Met., VIII, 4).
“Quæris”, wrote Leibniz to Joh. Bernoulli in 1698, “quid mihi hic sit incompletum? Respondeo: passivum sine
activo et activum sine passivo. [...] Monadem completam, seu substantiam singularem, voco non tam animam,









3. The “principium unitatis in Entibus per se” (A VI, IV, 1508) is not the agent of the union .
Neither there is in Leibniz’s mind, as we have seen, any distinctive forma corporeitatis.  But in
1699 he writes in the draft of a letter to De Volder: ”Posterior quæstio est, an corpus animatum habeat
proprias Entelechias ab anima distinctas? Respondeo habere easque innumerabiles, cum rursus constet
ex partibus privatim animatis vel actuatis” (GP II, 187). There is a continuous stream of, let us say,
“realist immaterialism” in Leibniz, since his youthful times. So matter is but a phænomenon, that
lacks true unity and real union. Yet, in 1716 Leibniz still rejects the non-existence of matter: «Je n’ai
garde aussi de dire que la matiere est une ombre, et même un rien. Ces sont des expressions outrées.
Elle est un amas, non substantia, sed substantiatum, comme seroit une armée, un trouppeau; et en
tant qu’on la considere comme faisant une chose, c’est un phenomene, très veritable en effet, mais
dont notre conception fait l’unité» (GP VI, 625). In this perspective, he makes even bigger efforts to
reform his Aristotelian committments.
In a short text (P, 208) that might be dated to 1709, he writes down a very clean description of
a quite innovative model of the “composite substance”, the same “substance composée” that will be
quietly adopted in the PNG and the Monadology.
“Substantia composita est Monas sumta cum suo corpore organico, ut homo, ovis. Quod corpus organicum ex
innumeris aliis monadibus constat. Substantia ergo composita conflatur ex materia et forma. Materia ejus componitur
tam ex passivo primario quod est in Monade ipsa, et cætera virtualiter complectitur, quam ex secundariis passivis,
quæ insunt cæteris monadibus”.
All creatures are “substantiæ compositæ, habentes Monadem cum massa regulari. Solus Deus, fons
monadum, corpus non habet. Interim Monades ipsæ incorporeæ sunt”. This substantial composite is
made up of matter and form: nevertheless its form is not the monadic soul, the simple individual
that informs the bodily mass as an essential unity: “Forma substantiæ compositæ constat ex omnibus
entelechiis tam primaria, nempe ipsius Monadis dominantis, seu anima, quam ex cæteris entelechiis
monadum quæ corpus organicum ingrediuntur”.
The organic body is a particular case of a specific metaphysical category—that already quoted
above, of the substantiate: “Substantiatum est, quod ex pluribus substantiis resultat, ut grex ovium,
cætus hominum, massa aquæ, piscina plena aqua et piscibus. Hujus attributa sunt [tam] passiva, nempe
magnitudo et figura, situs, quam activa nempe impetus, ex quibus nascuntur actiones et passiones,
motus et ictus”. The composite substance “habet attributa substantiati”, the monad “habet horum
expressiones”. The expressive connection of the soul, or dominant monad, to the substantiatum it
dominates and “monadates” corresponds to the active and passive powers that have thus been
identified in the monad herself and in the multiplicity of corporeal substance that flow in the body.
Such elements help Leibniz in devising solutions to the Union-Aggregates problem, not neces-
sarily coincident with the well-known vinculum substantiale. That “Aggregata non constituunt sup-
positum” (LH IV 1, 1a, 7r; App. 1), is obviously clear to Leibniz. In this quite late ms. (1712?),
aggregates exhibit according to him two kinds of union: a. unio mathematica seu contactus , and
b. unio physica seu impulsus (f.i. the conspiring movements that explain solidity). True CSs, then,
require a metaphysical union: “ut oriatur substantia corporea, concipimus Unionem illam Metaphysi-
cam cuius complementum facit suppositalitatem” . He had defended his system against Tournemine,
Aquinas: “unio [...] est relatio tantum, quamvis unitio etiam sit actio [...] unio dicitur per comparationem ad
terminum vel effectum conjunctionis, qui est esse unum” (Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 5 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 3 co.). The unitio
is the creator’s office.
In a well-known letter to Hansch of 1716 it is written: “Substantiatum ego appello aggregatum ex monadibus.
Omne vivum appellari posset Monadatum, quod ab una scilicet Monade dominante vegetatur” (D V, 173).
Contact of countable entities. He had written to De Volder in 1703: “Neque etiam video quomodo pro Entibus
realibus et substantiis habendis careri possit veris unitatibus. Arbitrariæ vero unitates, quibus in Mathesi utimur,
hujus loci non sunt, quia etiam Entibus apparentibus accommodantur, qualia sunt omnia Entia per aggregationem
ut grex, exercitus, quorum unitas est a cogitatione; idemque est in quovis aggregato, ut nihil vere unum invenias,
si Entelechia demas” (GP II, 250).
I.e. that is truly substantial when it is completed. “Existentia naturæ substantialis erit complete terminata, quando
fuerit affecta modo existendi per se; hic ergo modus [...] habet propriam rationem personalitatis seu supposital-
itatis [...] hic ergo ultimus est terminus naturæ secundum existentiam eius, et hoc est proprium munus supposi-









advancing that “l’Union Métaphysique qu’on y adjoute, n’est pas un Phenomene, et comme on n’en
a pas même donné une Notion intelligible, je n’ay pas pris sur moy d’en chercher la raison” (GP VI,
595); to which his adversary had objected, that it had to be a “real union”, and not some metaphysical
oddity. Now, “metaphysical union” is treated by Leibniz as a basic concept. We are not very far
from the themes and vocabulary of the correspondence with Des Bosses in 1712-13: “Si substantia
corporea aliquid reale est praeter monades, uti linea aliquid esse statuitur praeter puncta, dicendum
erit, substantiam corpoream consistere in unione quadam, aut potius uniente reali a Deo superaddito
monadibus” (GP II, 435). Our ms. might be a development of this perspective, to the abandon of
which its composition might even have contributed:
“Ego quoque sentio, admissis Substantialibus praeter monades, seu admissa Unione quadam reali, aliam longe esse
Unionem, quae facit ut anima vel quodvis corpus naturae organicum sit Unum substantiale, habens una Monada
dominantem, quam Unionem, quae facit simplex aggregatum” (GP II, 457).
It is the activity of the monadic corporeal substances in the bodily mass that is newly considered
as a positive principle: “Entelechia complexa est omnium monadicarum corporis datis complexus”
(LH IV 1, 1a, 8r; App. 2). The substantiatum has thus even a formality of its own. In LH IV 1, 1a,
7r, Leibniz sketches on that base an alternative to the vinculum substantiale and to the reality of
composites, for all that he adds: “omnia hæc disparerent, si nihil essent nisi Monades et phænomena”.
Leibniz had often written: “le corps à part, sans l’ame, n’a qu’une unité d’aggregation, mais la
realité qui lui reste provient des parties qui le compose et qui retiennent leur unité substantielle à
cause des corps vivans qui y sont enveloppés sans nombre” (GP II, 100); “ces ames ou entelechies ont
toutes une maniere de corps organique avec elles proportionné à leur perceptions” (GP III, 340); “les
corps sont des multitudes et les ames sont des unités mais des unités qui expriment ou representent
la multitude en elles” (GP VII, 452). The union per concomitantiam, or consensum, has indeed its
foundation in the representations of the monads. “Monades non sunt in loco nisi per harmoniam id est
per consensum cum phænomenis loci, a nullo influxu sed sponte rerum ortum” (LH IV 1, 1a, 9r). But
it is on the category of substantiatum that the move from concomitantia to fully developed harmonia
may be funded.
A couple of years later he’ll explain it to his new supporter Remond, and here’s what he’ll write:
“Une veritable substance (telle qu’un animal) est composée d’une ame immaterielle et d’un corps or-
ganique, et c’est le composé de ces deux qu’on appelle Unum per se”. This composition, unexpectedly
labeled by Leibniz “metaphysical union”, comes to pass, not in the form of some “unio substantialis
superaddita”, or “union reelle”, but, we might say, as part of a general unio ad modum harmoniæ:
“les ames s’accordent avec les corps et entre elles en vertu de l’harmonie préetablie, et nullement par
une influence physique mutuelle, sauve [i.e. without prejudice for] l’union métaphysique de l’ame et
de son corps, qui les fait composer unum per se, un animal, un vivant” (GP III, 657).
The key to the unio metaphysica lies in the end in the preestablished harmony—and in turn, in the
theory of relations. Admittedly, few elements of Leibniz’s frame of ideas are less easy to represent. Yet
Leibniz wrote encouragingly to a lady: “Cette Maxime de ne supposer sans necessité dans les creatures
que ce qui répond à nos experiences, m’a encor mené à mon système de l’harmonie préétablie” (GP
III, 340)—a peculiar statement indeed, anyhow a befitting one for us to come to an end.
Appendix 1 – LH IV 1, 1a, 7r
Notiones sunt Entium, aut Respectuum. Entia sunt Res aut Modi. Res sunt substantiæ aut phænomena. Substantiæ
sunt vel simplices vel compositæ. Substantia simplex est Monas; Monas autem est vel primitiva[,] Deus, a quo omnia:
vel derivativa, et hæc vel perceptiva tantum, vel etiam sensitiva; et hæc vel sensitiva tantum vel etiam intellectiva[,]
quæ et spiritus appellatur. Rursus Monas vel est Anima corporis, vel est separata; hæc vel creata (ut plerique volunt,
5 etsi ego an creatæ sint monades corporis expertas dubito), increata Deus. Substantia composita est, quæ resultat ex
substantiis simplicibus (Anima scilicet <propria> et substantiis simplicibus corpus componentibus[)], <conflata> ex
1 Notiones ... phænomena. ins. 1 sunt Entium sunt (1) Re (2) Entium aut (3) Entium 1 sunt (1) sub del. (2) Res 1 phænomena
(1) substantiata del. (2) phænomena ins. 1 Substantiæ (1) Substantiæ omnes vivunt, et omne vivens substantia del. (2)
Substantiata del. (3) Substantiæ 3 derivativa, (1) eaque aut rationa (2) sensiti (3) aut (4) et 4 quæ ... appellatur ins. 4 Rursus
(1) Substantiæ compositæ sunt Machinæ Naturales quæ consta del. (2) Rursus 4 vel (1) Corpor (2) est 5 monades ... expertas
ins. 5 dubito), vel del. 5 quæ resultat quæ (1) constat Anima tanquam (a) Monade (b) Forma, ex partibus del. (2) Anima
et corpus <—> del. substantiarum corr. (3) substantiis simplicibus tanquam componentibus, unione substantiali del. (4) resultat
ins. 6 simplicibus corpus componentibus, del., undel. by ed. 6-7 conflata ... passivis ins.
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materia quæ resultat ex earum potentiis passivis et Forma substantiali, quæ est Unio, Forma substantialis, quæ ex
entelechiis.
Hoc enim ponere necesse est aut statuere[,] solas Monades esse res; composita autem esse mera phænomena.
10 Phænomena sunt aggregata ex substantiis, quæ se certo modo exhibent percipienti, atque ita ad [instar] substan-
tiarum a nobis considerantur. Uti per nostram cogitationem phænomena ex substantiis oriuntur, ita per Divinam
Cogitationem oriuntur ex substantiis simplicibus compositæ, posito in Deo præter intellectum accedere voluntatem,
ut fiat ex multis unum; nam si tantum multa simul consideraret, phænomena ex iis seu aggregata faceret, uti cum
Deus novit iridem aut eius proprietates. At cum inde debet oriri novum Ens, oportet ut accedet divina voluntas. Porro
15 huius novi Entis partes non sunt monades, sed sunt eius fundamenta, uti puncta non sunt partes lineæ. Hoc novum
Ens constat ex Materia et forma. Materia est ortum totale ex viribus passivis omnium Monadum; et Forma est ortum
totale ex entelechiis primitivis omnium Monadum. Et hoc ortum cum non sit Modus sed aliquid absolutum posset
conservari in Deo destructis Monadibus, et vicissim ipso destructo possent conservari Monades.
Atque hæc est substantia corporea, quæ est in perpetuo fluxu[,] quam <sufficit> poni in corporibus patientibus
20 unum per se, seu organicis, et semper comitatur monadem dominantem. Porro modificationes sunt accidentia quæ ex
accidentibus Monadum oriuntur. Porro per hanc unionem efficitur ut ex anima et corpore una fiat persona, seu unum
suppositum, et ut plura corporis membra in idem suppositum ingrediantur. Aggregata non constituunt suppositum,
v.g. strues lignorum. Equidem in Aggregatis non sola est Unio mathematica seu contactus, sed etiam physica seu
impulsus; sed deest tamen Metaphysica seu suppositi, quæ unam sustantiam singularem facit, quæ si completa sit,
25 suppositalitas appellatur. Ut oriatur linea, superficies, corpus mathematicum, præter puncta, concipimus unionem
quandam punctorum, per quam fiat continuum. Ut oriatur corpus physicum, præter extensionem concipimus motum
seu loci continui vel spatii mutationem; et ita corporum impulsum. Sed ut oriatur substantia corporea, concipimus
Unionem illam Metaphysicam cuius complementum facit suppositalitatem. Sed omnia hæc disparerent, si nihil
essent nisi Monades et phænomena. Itaque si Monadibus addimus realitatem compositorum, oritur spatium, massa,
30 motus, substantia corporea.
Duo systemata unum: Monadum, alterum compositorum realium. Composita Realia sunt duo, immobile sive
immutabile, spatium; Mutabilia sunt corpora, et hæc sunt vel aggregata ex substantiis corporeis, vel substantiæ.
Substantiæ corporeæ debent ergo habere aliquid reale præter ingredientia, aut nihil supererit nisi Monades. Hoc
reale superadditum est quod facit substantialitatem corporis. Si Massis non aliam quam Φhænomenorum realitatem
35 concedamus, non habebimus <opus> spatio reali.
Appendix 2 – LH IV 1, 1a, 8r
Vis est vel primitiva, quam voco Entelechiam[,] vel derivativa, quam voco Nisum. Entelechia est vel Monadica,
vel complexa. Entelechia Monadica est dominans vel subjecta; utraque est vel anima vel forma simplex. Entelechia
Monadica est perennis, ut ipsæ Monades seu Atomi substantiæ. Monades tot sunt quot animalia vel <quasi> et
consistunt ex Entelechia Monadica et corpore Organico.
40 Entelechia complexa est omnium monadicarum corporis datis complexus. Hæc forma perit, et competit omnibus
corporibus etiam nullam monada constituentibus; ex ea tanquam causa activa nascuntur leges Mechanicæ; ut ex
materia. inerte tanquam causa passiva. Hæc durat cum materia, eaque dissoluta, perit.
Vis derivativa seu Nisus est id quod ipsa licet materia perstanti mutatur, consistitque in ipsa actionis quanti-
tate seu eo quod exercitur, per varios gradus celeritatis et directionis; oriturque et vis primitivæ limitatione seu
45 determinatione.
(For the ms. sources I thank the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, Hanovre).
7 Unio, (1) per quam sub (2) <per —> (3) quæ præter simplicia ingredientia (a) <po> (b) addit aliquid quo fiat unum reale del.
(4) Forma ... ex entelechiis ins. 9 enim nisi del. ponam corr. 9 statuere com del. 9 phænomena seu Entia rationis del.
10 exhibent menti del. 10 [instar] inter corr. by ed. 11 ex substantiis ins. 14 cum (1) vult (a) præterea (b) inde resultare
del. (2) inde ... oriri 14 voluntas. Hoc novum ens nodel. 15 eius <—> ins.et del. requisita del. fundamenta ins. 15 partes
(1) corporis del. (2) lineæ ins. 16 Ens constat del. 16 ortum resultans del. ortum ins. 16 ex omnibus del. 16 est (1)
res (2) subs del. ortum ins. 17 hoc (1) resultans del. (2) ortum ins. 17 sit Modificatio, sed del. 17 posset <confi>
del. 18 vicissim destructo Mo del. 19 Atque (1) Duo sunt genera resultantium, alia per se resultant, ut ex (a) linea matem (b)
puncti spati (c) terminis relatis; alia resultant accedente Dei voluntate, (aa) ut (bb) ex (2) Hæc substantia. (3) Co del. (4) Atque
19-20 quam ... dominantem (1) quæ est <unum per se> tantum ins. and del. (2) quam ... poni (a) cor (b) corporibus ... dominantem
ins. 21 Porro (1) Monades ipsæ per se nec in loco sunt sed del. nec ins. in motu, sed per Unionem del. (2) Porro 21 ut
(1) concipiantu (2) concipiatur quædam in corp (3) commercium anim del. 22 ut plures corr. 23 lignorum. Et est in illis
non nisi unio mathematica seu contactus. Imo est etiam Metaphysica seu impulsus del. 23 etiam (1) mat (2) metaphys del.
24 singularem facit completam del. 25 corpus mathematicum (1) corpus del. (2) (a) corpus (b) solidus ins.& del. (3)
corpus mathematicum ins. 26 corpus præt del. 26 motum <inst> del. 29 si phæ del. 29 realitatem realem corr.
29 spatium, corpus, m del. 31 immobile sive (1) <immobi> del. (2) immobile sive ins. 32 Mutabilia (1) Mobilia del.
(2) Mutabilia ins. 33 corporeæ p del. 35 spatio seu loco del. 36 Vis ... Entelechiam (1) Entelechia est duplex: Monadica
quæ est (a) Anima <sive> (b) Anima vel animæ analoga, (aa) et (bb) vel del. (2) Vis est (a) duplex del. (b) vel ins. ... voco
ins. Entelechiam corr. 37 utraque ins. 37 est estque corr. 37 forma <subs> del. 38 ut M del. 39 ex (1) Forma
del. (2) Entelechia et corpo del. 40 Entelechia ... complexus. Entelechia complexa est (1) Complexus (2) complexu (3)
omnium monadicarum corporis (a) <complex> (b) datis complexus (4) Hæc forma per del. 41 ea nascuntur leges Mechanicæ
del. 42 materia. seu <—> del. 42 Hæc ... perit. ins.L2 43 Vis (1) Vis secundaria seu Nisus del. (2) Vis 43 perstanti
(1) durant del. (2) perstanti 43-44 in ... quantitate (1) in acc. not del., del. by ed. vari (2) eo quod <proxime> del. (3)
in ... quantitate ins. 44 seu eo quod ins. 44 limitatione (1) de del. (2) limitatione
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